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Abstract
The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI)  was originally 
introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning autom-
ata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons 
for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics 
of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of 
the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a 
set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public 
accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, 
other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also hap-
pen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause 
which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It 
proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the 
responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatal-
ism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which 
reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem 
that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solu-
tionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the 
responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-
technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the 
relevant human reasons and capacities.
Keywords AI ethics · Responsibility gap · AI and accountability · Meaningful 
human control · Engineer responsibility
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1 Introduction
In 2004, Andreas Matthias introduced what he called the problem of “responsibil-
ity gap” with “learning automata” (Matthias, 2004). In a nutshell, intelligent sys-
tems equipped with the ability to learn from the interaction with other agents and 
the environment will make human control and prediction over their behaviour very 
difficult if not impossible, but human responsibility requires knowledge and con-
trol. Therefore, we as humanity are facing a dilemma: either we go on with the 
design and use of learning systems, thereby giving up on the possibility of having 
human persons responsible for their behaviour, or we preserve human responsibil-
ity, and thereby give up on the introduction of learning systems in society. Matthias 
formulation of the responsibility gap has been quite influential especially in rela-
tion to the development of autonomous weapon systems (Sparrow, 2007)(Human 
Right Watch, 2015).
More recently, the concern with “responsibility gaps” has been raised more gen-
erally in relation to artificial intelligence (AI), that is to any technique designed to 
solve problems traditionally assigned to human intelligence (Amoroso & Tamburrini, 
2019). Risks of gaps have been identified in relation not only to the learning capaci-
ties of AI but first and foremost to the opacity, complexity, and unpredictability that 
these systems generally display (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). In fact, the question so as to 
what extent persons can or should maintain responsibility for the behaviour of AI has 
become one of, if not the most discussed question in the growing field of so-called 
ethics of AI (Braun et al., 2020; Coeckelbergh, 2019; Nyholm, 2018).
However, whereas “responsibility” is known in philosophy and law for being an 
ambiguous and polysemantic term (Hart, 1968; Feinberg, 1970), this complexity 
is rarely reflected in the debates on responsibility for the behaviour of systems that 
include AI. Therefore, discussions about “responsibility” or “accountability gaps” 
are sometimes partial as they usually appeal to a non-sufficiently specified notion 
of responsibility. Moreover, the focus on learning automata or “autonomous sys-
tems” may be too limited. Responsibility gaps are due to a multiplicity of factors 
and are sometimes only aggravated by the presence of machines that learn and 
act on their own.1 In fact, sufficiently interconnected socio-technical systems, with 
limited artificial intelligence and capacity to learn, but relying on a complex tex-
ture of human agents and technical systems, such as bureaucracies or corporates, 
might also generate responsibility gaps. Considering different causes of respon-
sibility gaps related to AI and automation beyond “autonomy” and “learning” 
will contribute to carve the problem at the right joints and provide better insights 
towards possible solutions.
The first goal of this paper is thus reframing the responsibility gap discussion in 
terms that are better aligned with the categorisation of responsibility concepts in 
moral and legal philosophy. By doing so, we will be able to better see what kind of 
1 One important additional reason to shift the focus away from “autonomous systems” is that the concept 
of machine autonomy itself is very controversial, tends to raise philosophical debates that do not help 
clarifying the issue of responsibility gaps, and may shift attention away from other urgent ethical issues 
with (non-autonomous) AI.
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responsibility is threatened by which aspect of automation and why this matters.2 
We take some concepts and distinctions from philosophical, legal, and sociologi-
cal theory of responsibility (Bovens, 1998; Collingridge, 1980; Hart, 1968; Pesch, 
2015; van de Poel & Sand, 2018), and we use them to identify four different kinds 
of responsibility gaps: the culpability gap, the moral accountability gap, the pub-
lic accountability gap, and the active responsibility gap. We will also identify, for 
each of those, different possible causes, integrating Matthias’ classic analysis that 
identified learning capacities of automata as the main source of responsibility gaps, 
generically speaking. To a deeper look, Matthias addressed in his work what we 
will call the culpability gap – the risk that no human agent might be legitimately 
blamed or held culpable for the unwanted outcomes of actions mediated by AI sys-
tems. Gaps in this kind of responsibility have already received some attention, both 
from a moral (Matthias, 2004; Sparrow, 2007) and a legal perspective (Calo, 2015; 
Pagallo, 2013). Attention also went to the “accountability gap” in relation to autono-
mous weapon systems (AWS) (Heyns, 2013); (Meloni, 2016), and more generally 
within the discussion on explainability of algorithms and AI (Mittelstadt 2016; 
Doran et al. 2017; Pasquale, 2016). However, we propose to distinguish two forms 
of the accountability gap: the “public accountability gap”, i.e. citizens not being able 
to get an explanation for decisions taken by public agencies, and a broader “moral 
accountability gap” – i.e. the reduction of human agents’ capacity to make sense 
of – and explain to each other the “logic” of their behaviour, due to the mediation 
of opaque, unexplainable algorithms and complex autonomous systems and/or the 
lack of appropriate psychological, social incentives or institutional spaces that pro-
mote these explanations. One particularly important form of the moral accountabil-
ity gap is that concerning the difficulty for engineers and other agents involved in 
the process of technological development to systematically discuss with one another 
their understanding of the goal and meaning of this process. Finally, the “active 
responsibility gap” has not to our knowledge been addressed as such so far. This 
gap consists in the risk that persons designing, using, and interacting with AI may 
not be sufficiently aware, capable, and motivated to see and act according to their 
moral obligations towards the behaviour of the systems they design, control, or use. 
In particular,this gap concerns the obligation to  ensure that these systems do not 
impact negatively on the rights and interests of other persons and, ideally, positively 
contribute to their well-being instead. Distinguishing four responsibility gaps and 
their various sources is the focus of the first part of this paper.
In the second part, we will show some of the common approaches that have so far 
been taken towards addressing responsibility gaps. We show how those approaches 
offer a partial and limited understanding of the responsibility gap and thus offer solu-
tions that would apply only to specific aspects of them. Those who will be here called 
“fatalists” (Matthias, 2004; Sparrow, 2007) tend to focus on a too limited understand-
ing of the responsibility gap, that is a gap in culpability for the behaviour of learn-
ing technological automata. Those who will be here called “deflationists” (Simpson & 
Müller, 2016) underestimate the novelty of the AI revolution and its implication for 
culpability attributions in morality (blameworthiness) and the law (liability); they also 
2 See (Di Nucci & Santoni de Sio, 2016) for an early attempt to clarify this.
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seem to underestimate the risks of gaps in the moral and political accountability of sys-
tem designers as well as gaps in theirs and other agents’ active responsibility for the 
behaviour of artificial intelligence. Promoters of “explainable AI” and other scientific 
and technological improvements tend to ignore the psychological, social, and political 
dimension of the interaction with AI, thereby running the risk of embracing some form 
of “technical solutionism” (Stilgoe, 2017), by which all the moral and social problem 
of human responsibility for the behaviour of artificial intelligence can be fixed sim-
ply by an improvement of the working of AI techniques. Lawyers and policy-makers 
proposing the revision of current legal liability regimes (including extension of strict 
and product liability regimes, and “electronic personhood”) may either underestimate 
the importance of maintaining some form of human moral responsibility on the behav-
iour of the artificial intelligence or recognise this need but without saying how moral 
and social practices – and not only legal rules – should change in order to govern a 
responsible transition to the use of AI. We call this the risk of “legal solutionism”. One 
result of this critical review is the recognition that the different notions of responsibil-
ity, though distinct, are also interconnected and that often addressing one kind of gap 
requires attention to one or more of the others. This suggests the necessity of a more 
integrated and comprehensive approach.
We will conclude this paper by sketching such a more encompassing approach 
which, as we argue, can contribute to address a larger number of gaps in their inter-
connections. We will suggest that one recent approach to “meaningful human control” 
(MHC) (Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) 
might be suitable to frame the several responsibility gaps within a bigger scheme and 
offer principles to transversally address them. Future research will develop this pro-
posal in more detail.
2  Varieties of Responsibility Gaps
The term “responsibility” has different meanings. H.L.A. Hart’s classical account (Hart, 
1968) lists four senses (role-responsibility, causal responsibility, capacity-responsibil-
ity, liability-responsibility). Based among others on the work of John Gardner (2007), 
Mark Bovens (1998), and Ibo van de Poel (2015), we work with a revised and modified 
list of four forms of responsibility that are particularly relevant – yet not limited to – the 
context of automation and artificial intelligence: culpability, moral accountability, pub-
lic accountability, and active responsibility. The next four sub-sections present these 
four forms of responsibility and identify the specific related challenges presented, or 
furthered, by the introduction of artificial intelligence (Table 1). Some examples will 
serve as illustration.
2.1  Culpability Gaps
When things go wrong and important interests or rights such as physical integrity 
or life are infringed, we, as victims and as society, not only want to understand 
what happened and why. We also want to know whether the harm was the result 
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of someone’s wrong behaviour, and if it turns out that the wrong behaviour is one 
for which there is no justification or excuse, we want the author to be condemned, 
sanctioned, or even punished for their behaviour. This is in a nutshell culpability 
or blameworthiness. Whether and to what extent attributions of culpability make 
sense has been the main subject of the centuries-long philosophical debate on free 
will, typically in the light of causal determinism (is it fair to blame each other if 
all our actions are necessarily caused by previous physical and mental events?) or 
more generally in the light of a view of human behaviour shaped by (neuro)scientific 
knowledge (if human action can be fully explained by behavioural/social/neurosci-
ence, what is left of moral culpability?) (for a general discussion along these lines, 
see, e.g. (Pereboom, 2006)). However, many philosophers and most lawyers and lay-
persons do believe that (fair) social and legal practices of attribution of culpability 
should also be maintained and promoted (as opposed to just relying on any form of 
social and psychological education or therapy) (Morse, 2006), at least to the extent 
they are the legitimate expression of appropriate moral sentiments by the wronged 
individuals and society at large (Strawson, 1962), they reinforce the social commit-
ments to shared norms (Sie, 2005), and, possibly most importantly, they contribute 
to control and reduce undesirable behaviour. Similarly, also state-administered pun-
ishment for serious criminal behaviour may be morally defensible and even desir-
able insofar as it gives effectiveness to the expression of public condemnation (Fein-
berg, 1965), and serves the utilitarian goals of discouraging similar behaviour by 
the defendant themselves in the future and by other citizens more generally. Finally, 
(public) attributions of culpability have the function to compensate the victims 
– symbolically, or even materially, typically in the case of compensations to plain-
tiffs in civil litigations.
AI-based systems may put culpability practices under stress in different ways, 
preventing the realisation of one or more of their goals. Consider, as an example, 
automated driving systems (ADS). First, ADS may make the network of agents 
involved in the driving more complex, just because more agents are involved and/
or new forms of interactions are created. For instance, a vehicle may be oper-
ated by a driver D1, with the assistance of the automated driving system AS, 
produced by the car manufacturer X, powered with digital systems developed by 
the company Y, possibly including some form of machine learning developed 
by the company Z, and enriched by data coming from different sources, includ-
ing the driving experience of drivers D2, D3…Dn; vehicles in this system are in 
principle subject to a standardisation process done by the agency S, the traffic is 
regulated by the governmental agency G, drivers are trained and licensed by the 
agency L etc. Second, some specific features of present-day learning AI systems 
may make this interaction particularly unpredictable – typically when the vehi-
cles’ performance is potentially re-designed by the second on the basis of new 
data acquisition and processing – and opaque, if the reasoning scheme underlying 
systems’ actions is not easily accessible to their controllers, regulators, or even 
their designers.
Agents operating in such a socio-technical system (designers, programmers, 
drivers, regulators, bystanders etc.) may more easily find themselves acting 
wrongly, for instance, causing an avoidable road crash, while at the same time 
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having a legitimate excuse. Nobody, and certainly not them, could reasonably pre-
dict certain circumstances or reasonably avoid a certain outcome, therefore not 
being open to legitimate blame (Matthias, 2004; Sparrow, 2007). We call this the 
“culpability gap”.
The culpability gap has not been created by the introduction of “learning automata” 
(machine learning) and their inherent unpredictability, as it has been framed by some 
authors (e.g. Matthias, 2004). As a matter of fact, other intelligent, autonomous entities 
with “no soul to blame and no body to kick” (Asaro, 2012), such as, e.g. bureaucracies 
and corporates, may in themselves generate gaps in culpability.3 This has been clas-
sically identified as “the problem of many hands” (Bovens, 1998; Thompson, 1980). 
Artificial intelligence plays however an important role by contributing to create new 
versions of the phenomenon and thus making it more visible. Also, the use of artificial 
intelligence and data-driven machine learning in decision-making importantly intro-
duces a new element of technical opacity and lack of explainability that makes it more 
difficult for individual persons to satisfy the traditional conditions for moral and legal 
culpability: intention, foreseeability, and control.4
Culpability gaps are concerning insofar as the more persons designing, regulat-
ing, and operating the system can legitimately (and possibly systematically) avoid 
blame for their wrong behaviour, the less these agents will be incentivised to pre-
vent these wrong behaviours. In fact,  they will arguably have less incentives to 
strive for a high(er) level of safety, awareness, attention, motivation, and skilfulness. 
Also,victims of unjust harm will be less likely to receive compensation. Finally, it 
might become more difficult for persons more generally to make sense of their moral 
sentiments in relation to wrongs and accidents and to direct one’s reactive attitudes 
towards some legitimate target. This may impoverish the human capacity to express 
moral judgement and may feed helplessness and moral scepticism towards the possi-
bility of understanding and rectifying wrongdoing. As noted by Danaher (2016), the 
desire to find a scapegoat to satisfy these feelings may also be fuelled.
2.2  Moral Accountability Gaps
Culpability is a particularly serious form of (moral) responsibility, but it is not the 
only one. Individual persons are often called to respond for their choices or actions 
in less threatening ways, for instance, when family, friends, or acquaintances ask 
them why-questions, not necessarily with the intention of judging or blaming 
them but possibly to just engage in a conversation and to better understand each 
other’s reasons and expectations. Why were you late at the appointment, why did 
you start taking guitar classes, why did you turn down that job offer…? We will 
call this expectation to answer (at least some) why-questions from other persons’ 
“moral accountability”, to distinguish it from the “public accountability” discussed 
below. Moral accountability has been presented in the philosophical literature on 
3 As a broader philosophical point, it has been argued that even cultural systems can be seen as types of 
“automata” (Sini, 2021) for their evolution cannot be controlled by individuals while rather shaping and 
constraining individual behaviour.
4 More on this in the section “Fatalism and deflationism” below.
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moral responsibility as a key-aspect for the justification and understanding of moral 
responsibility practices (Wolf, 1990; McKenna, 2012). The legal philosopher John 
Gardner calls it “basic responsibility” insofar as he sees it as the core of what it 
means to be a reflective person in society (Gardner, 2007). In this sense, being 
accountable, unlike being culpable, is something to be desired rather than avoided 
insofar as it is a constitutive part of being able to reflect on one’s actions and to 
participate in meaningful social relations. It also helps persons seeing events in the 
world as connected to their rational capacities and thereby supporting their sense of 
agency and responsibility (Honoré, 1999). It is a classic view of human responsibil-
ity, which can be reported back to the old Socratic motto “know thyself”. In fact, 
Gardner calls this the “Aristotelian story” about responsibility, insofar as it focuses 
on the persons’ capacity to make sense of theirs and others’ actions and choices as 
something connected to their abstract reasons (as opposed, for instance, to just phys-
ical or biological events).
Moral accountability also has an instrumental value. The process of exchang-
ing questions and reasons helps finding explanations for things that have happened, 
reinforces trust and social connections between agents, and by exposing persons to 
potential requests for explanation and justification, it also tends to reduce undesired 
behaviour by pushing persons to be more clearly aware of the impact of their actions 
on others and therefore motivated to prevent unwanted outcomes (and potential 
blameworthiness). In relation to engineering practices, Genus and Stirling (2018) 
have recently stressed out the importance of Collingridge’s proposal to “engage 
more strongly with accountability in debates bearing on key elements of responsible 
innovation” (Collingridge, 1980, p. 62). In their view, also inspired by Lindblom 
(1990), accountability is a key tool to enhance the reflexivity of the agents involved 
in the design and development of (new) technologies, and to promote responsive-
ness between them and those who will be affected by their creations. In the literature 
on “responsible research and innovation”, the importance of accountability practices 
has been recently emphasised and categorised under the label of “responsiveness 
between stakeholders” (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
Moral accountability may be blurred in different ways by the introduction of 
artificial intelligence. First, in general, similar to what observed above about cul-
pability, by contributing to create a more complex chain of decision-making and 
action, AI may make more difficult for individual agents to make sense of the rea-
sons why a certain decision was taken, what their role exactly was in the opera-
tion, and, in general, whose reasons and what reasoning were governing the sys-
tem they are part of. However, data-driven machine (deep) learning, due to its 
intrinsic opacity, might make a system’s behaviour extra hard to understand and 
explain. In addition, the whole process of technology development and produc-
tion is arguably pervaded by an increasing pressure towards deploying proprietary 
technologies that, even when working through mechanisms accessible to their 
developers and programmers, are designed to be inaccessible to public scrutiny 
and the users themselves (Pasquale, 2015). Technology developers, driven by both 
the desire to minimise industrial espionage and maximise customers loyalty (by, 
e.g. binding them to their assistance network), will usually avoid sharing data and 
engineering insights.
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An example of AI affecting moral accountability specifically due to the opacity 
and complexity of AI may be that of a medical doctor using an AI-driven system 
for diagnosing. These systems are usually based on deep learning techniques that 
require a thorough training over a dataset the nature of which is well-known and 
clear. In other words, the system will train on a set of well-known, well-established 
cases, before being applied to new and unknown cases. The way knowledge is repre-
sented in the machine and the exact way the machine distinguishes between a posi-
tive and negative diagnosis are not only inaccessible to the doctor who uses the sys-
tem but also, to an important extent, to those who designed it (Castelvecchi, 2016). 
Therefore, the capacity of the different agents, including the users, to make sense of 
the “logic” of the systems’ behaviour may be weakened and sometimes lost, together 
with their capacity and willingness to engage in a meaningful conversation about 
their role and the responsibility that comes with it. This may create different kinds 
of problems, depending on the (professional) context, and the roles, the responsibili-
ties, and the human and social relations pertaining to it. The general concern is that 
AI may make individual persons less able to understand, explain, and reflect upon 
their own and other agents’ behaviour. Let us call this the moral accountability gap.
2.3  Public Accountability Gaps
One specific form of accountability is attached on politicians, civil servants, and 
other agents invested with a public function: public accountability. Public account-
ability,5 in Mark Bovens’ definition, is a “relationship between an actor and a forum, 
in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, 
the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face conse-
quences” (Bovens, 2007). According to Bovens, effective mechanisms of account-
ability may enhance both the effectiveness of a complex public decision-making 
system and its compliance with the liberal-democratic values (Bovens, 1998, 2007). 
Accountability promotes democratic control (transparency), limits abuses of power 
(corruption), but also brings more effectiveness in the institutions. In fact, provid-
ing administrators with information about their own functioning and forcing them to 
reflect on their successes and failures will eventually allow and encourage them and 
others to improve their future performances.
There has recently been a big legal and political debate on the extent to which the 
introduction of AI-based automated (administrative) decision-making is desirable and 
legitimate (European Commission, 2019; Hildebrandt, 2019; Noto La Diega, 2018). 
Also, it has been doubted that the GDPR provisions guarantee sufficient transparency 
and accessibility to these mechanisms for those who are subject to them (Edwards & 
Veale, 2017; Wachter et  al., 2017). Most of these discussions point to the fact that 
algorithmic decision-making is often difficult to understand for – and explain to 
– human agents, due to the different, and sometimes inscrutable for persons, ways of 
AI operations: the so-called “black box” problem (Castelvecchi, 2016). However, Noto 
5 Bovens just speaks of “accountability”, but it is clear from the context of his work that he is talking of 
public accountability; we make the specification explicit to distinguish this from “moral accountability’ 
discussed above.
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La Diega (2018) correctly notices that issues of explainability may arise not only due 
to technical black boxes but also due to what he calls organisational and legal black 
boxes created or aggravated by the introduction of AI in public administration.
Zouridis et al. (2019) have further explained the sources of these organisational 
and legal black boxes and their relevance to public accountability. Traditionally, 
public agencies were organised as “street-level” bureaucracies. Processes were man-
aged by individual case managers who had direct contact with individual citizens 
and substantial discretionary powers (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002; Lipsky, 1980). 
With the introduction of digital decision-making systems, these discretionary pow-
ers of the street-level professionals have been disciplined. However, this has also 
greatly shifted the locus of administrative discretion from individual public offic-
ers to IT experts, responsible for programming the decision-making process and 
translating the legislation into software, and to the data analysts, who are responsi-
ble for the acquisition and analysis of data (Zouridis et al., 2019). Moreover, these 
“system-level” bureaucracies are part of larger networks and chains of delegation in 
which data are exchanged and reused (Van Eck, 2018). This shift raises three chal-
lenges for public accountability. First, development in information technologies is 
often outsourced to private parties or tech-giants, such as Google, who are not politi-
cally accountable and may not be willing to disclose critical information about the 
functioning of their systems (Pasquale, 2015). For example, in her book Automating 
Inequality, Virginia Eubanks (2018) tells the stories of private contractors not being 
able and/or willing of disclosing the reasons for the failures/mistakes in their digital 
systems used by some US states for welfare benefit allocation procedures. Second, 
more generally, the work of the software engineers and data professionals in public 
organisations is usually not visible and subject to public and legal scrutiny. Finally, 
far more data are exchanged between many different (public) organisations than in 
the past. In this way, the introduction of AI makes the “problem of many hands” 
(Bovens, 1998; Thompson, 1980) more acute: data coming from different sources 
are introduced and enriched at different points in the data chain. Individual citizens 
may have a hard time finding out who they should turn to, if data are incorrect, cor-
rupted, or biased as a collective outcome of a series of minor contributions. Techni-
cal, organisational, and legal black boxes are the sources of what we call the public 
accountability gap with artificial intelligence.
2.4  Active Responsibility Gap
The philosophical literature on professional responsibility of engineers usually dis-
tinguishes between “active” and “passive” responsibility (Bovens, 1998). In a nut-
shell, active responsibility is forward-looking and concerns the goals, values, and 
(legal) norms that professionals such as engineers are supposed to promote and 
comply with as well as the consequences they need to prevent and avoid.6 Passive 
responsibility is backward-looking and concerns the moral and legal consequences 
engineers must face in case something goes wrong. The three forms of moral 
6 Not to be confused with the “forward-looking account of culpability” in the debate on the justification 
of practices of attribution of moral blameworthiness.
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responsibility discussed above – culpability, moral, and public accountability – are 
all forms of passive responsibility. The legal duty to provide high standards of safety 
and the so-called corporate social responsibility of companies would be typical 
examples of active responsibility.
One well-known problem with the active responsibility of engineers is that while 
engineers have arguably an individual active responsibility to promote societal goods, 
their work is most often embedded in networks of different agents and institutions 
(Swierstra & Jelsma, 2006). They may, for instance, be involved in projects connect-
ing scientists and their academic institutions and technological companies operating 
on the market. As seen above, this may create problems for the attribution of passive 
responsibility, as in case something goes wrong, it may be easy (and sometimes legiti-
mate) for individual engineers to shift responsibility to other agents or institutions in 
their network, and it sometimes may be even the case that nobody can legitimately be 
held responsible for one specific unwanted event (Van de Poel et al., 2015). What is 
often overlooked is that the networked nature of the engineering work may also create 
issues with the attribution of active responsibility. As noted by Pesch (2015), engineers 
may not have a clear and consistent representation of what their (social) role is – are 
they scientists, technicians, business persons? what are the goals and values they should 
strive for: truth, innovation, market shares? They may not even have clear and shared 
systems of principles, norms and rules to follow in their profession, and/or the capacity 
or motivation to reflect upon and interpret these rules in concrete cases.7
Based on the general framework above, we propose that the introduction of AI 
may create two different but related sets of issues. First, engineers and other agents 
involved in the development and use of technology may not be (fully)aware of their 
respective moral and social obligations towards other agents. Think, as an example, 
of a manager of an IT company who, as a result of her personal education or the 
engineering and business culture in which she has been raised, is genuinely and 
sincerely convinced that: (a) she is benefitting the public by providing them with 
more comfort through the use of their new products and that (b) it is not her respon-
sibility to try to minimise the possible negative impact of the use of these products 
on people’s well-being, privacy, or political freedom.8 In Van de Poel’s and Sand’s 
(2018) classification of active responsibility, this is a gap in “obligation”. Second, 
engineers and other agents involved in the development and use of technology may 
7 According to Pesch (Pesch, 2015), what we call “the active responsibility gap” of engineers has old 
historical roots. Institutions like the modern state, the market, and science, have since the time of their 
birth been the object of systematic intellectual reflection by statesmen, scientists, philosophers, etc., and 
they were therefore seen and built according to a complex “intellectual template” ((Pesch, 2015),p 930). 
Modern technology development, on the other hand, “has never been integrated into this template. Tech-
nology has never received the same intellectual attention as a foundation for modern life as the realms 
of politics, economics, and science, and its integration into these realms has been largely a contingent 
one” ((Pesch, 2015), p 930). In fact, whereas political philosophy, philosophy of science and political 
economy are well-established disciplines with deep historical roots; philosophy of engineering is in com-
parison a relatively new and not even fully established and recognised academic discipline. This problem 
concerns primarily engineers, but, as we will see more in detail below, also other professionals involved 
in the design, development, regulation, control, and even use of technology.
8 A remarkable example of this attitude is that of the IT developers who invented popular social network 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, interviewed in the Netflix documentary The Social Dilemma.
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not be sufficiently able or motivated to fulfil an obligation they may be well aware 
of. Think, as an example, of military personnel using a new AI-based weapon sys-
tem: while being perfectly aware of their general obligation to use the system in 
compliance with the requirement of international law, they may end up making an 
illegal use of the system, due to insufficient technical training, and/or not having 
(yet) been able to develop a sufficient capacity to resist the pressure to use the tech-
nology in a certain way, coming from superiors and her environment more gener-
ally. In van de Poel and Sand’s (2018) classification of active responsibility, this is 
a gap in “virtue”, i.e. the concrete capacity and inclination to perform according to 
certain norms and principles. Let’s call these two issues, taken together, the active 
responsibility gap.
3  Partial Answers to Responsibility Gaps: “Fatalism”, “Deflationism”, 
and the Risks of “Solutionism”
In the previous section, we have seen how considering different senses of respon-
sibility allows to highlight the existence of four different kinds of responsibility 
gaps with AI (see Table 1). The problem of responsibility gap with AI, as it turns 
out, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps 
in culpability, moral accountability, public accountability, and active responsibility. 
Moreover, these gaps are caused by different sources, some of which are old, i.e. the 
complexity of social and technical systems; some new, i.e. the data-driven learning 
features of present-day AI; some more technical, i.e. the intrinsic opacity of algo-
rithimic decision-making; some more political and economic, i.e. the implicit pri-
vatisation of public administration; and some more societal, i.e. the engineers’ and 
other actors’ lack of awareness and/or capacity to comply with their (new) moral, 
legal, societal obligations. Sufficient awareness of this complexity has been missing 
in the debate so far. Current debates have posed a strong accent, from time to time, 
on mainly one of these different problems and one or two of their sources thereby 
often not giving sufficient attention to the broader picture. In this second part of the 
paper, we make a critical revision of a representative sample of the literature on the 
responsibility gap, with a twofold goal: first, to show the extent to which this litera-
ture misses out on the complexity of the responsibility gap, and second, to suggest 
that taking such a partial approach to the responsibility gap not only brings the risk 
of offering an incomplete picture of the problem but also a distorted one. We present 
three possible distortions in the presentation of the responsibility gap with AI, which 
we call, respectively: “fatalism”, i.e. the idea that the responsibility gap is a new and 
intractable problem; “deflationism”, i.e. the idea that the responsibility gap is not 
new and not a problem; and “solutionism”, i.e. the idea that the responsibility gap is 
a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools 
(Fig. 1). To be clear, we are not claiming that every author discussing one aspect 
of the responsibility gap should necessarily also be victim of one of these distor-
tions: as a matter of fact, many authors are well aware that they are addressing only 
one aspect of a more complex problem. What we are suggesting is that, in the long 
run, focusing only on these partial analyses may provide a misleading picture of the 
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responsibility gap as well as hindering the creation of an appropriate response. In 
the last part, we will preliminarily consider how a more encompassing approach, 
such as designing for “meaningful human control”, might represent such an alterna-
tive, more appropriate answer.
3.1  Fatalism and Deflationism
At the two extremes of the debate on responsibility gaps are those whom we will 
call, respectively, fatalists and deflationists. The fatalist approach is best captured by 
Matthias, 2004 paper on “The responsibility gap for learning automata”. According 
to Matthias, the introduction of learning automata in society poses an unprecedented 
challenge to moral responsibility (culpability) and presents us with a moral dilemma. 
Culpability requires knowledge; learning systems make knowledge (i.e. prediction of 
outcomes) impossible; therefore, learning automata make impossible to (legitimately) 
attribute culpability to human persons for the actions mediated by learning systems. 
We as a society are then facing a dilemma: either we introduce learning systems and 
give up on culpability, or we maintain culpability, and give up on the introduction of 
learning systems in society (Matthias, 2004). Matthias formulation of the responsibil-
ity gap has been quite influential especially in relation to the development of autono-
mous weapon systems (Sparrow, 2007). In this perspective, the responsibility gap cre-
ated by learning automata (AI) is a new, serious, and intractable problem. We have 
argued above that the culpability gap is not completely new, and we will suggest below 
how it could be potentially addressed by designing socio-technical systems with a new 
notion of human control.
At the other extreme of the debate are those who believe that the culpability gap 
for learning automata and AI more generally is not a problem after all, and any-
way not a new one, so that old technical, moral, and legal recipes will just suffice. 
We will call these “deflationists”. Some deflationists just embrace the first horn of 
Matthias’ dilemma. If we have reasons to believe that the introduction of learning 
Fig. 1  Partial answers to responsibility gaps and their limits
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automata will bring significant societal benefits, for instance, in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, or overall safety of the processes, we may and should introduce 
these in society, even if this will lead to some erosion of human moral responsibil-
ity (in any possible sense), for the (ex hypothesi reduced in number) accidents. For 
instance, many believe that, if the introduction of AI in critical tasks such as medi-
cine, transport, and warfare is likely to reduce the overall number of deaths or inju-
ries by reducing the impact of human error, then we should not care too much about 
the risk of gaps in moral responsibility. This is a too simple utilitarian approach, 
which tends to obfuscate the moral relevance of individual moral and legal duties 
and rights (Santoni de Sio, 2017). It also ignores the moral relevance of fairness and 
distributive justice in assessing the moral risks of technology (Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 
2012). However, Simpson and Müller (2016) have proposed a more sophisticated 
version of deflationism, one which embraces the first horn of Matthias dilemma 
(accepting learning systems and some gaps in moral culpability), while trying to pay 
due respect to individual rights and distributive justice. Simpson and Müller admit 
that AI may create some culpability gaps, but, so they claim, this is not new. Also, 
non-intelligent, non-learning systems like bridges and buildings sometimes collapse 
(fail) without any human person being culpable for that, and we as a society find 
this acceptable, insofar as all reasonable precautions had been taken, and nobody 
could have reasonably prevented the accident. The same can be said about AI. In 
contrast to utilitarian approaches, Simpson and Müller take a “non-aggregative” and 
“contractarian” approach to the ethics of risk and claim that we as a society have 
two obligations: to reduce the aggregate risks involved in the use of technology, and 
to minimise the risk of harm to each of the persons involved. If these two goals are 
achieved by the introduction of a given technology, and a “tolerance level” for fail-
ure is set that is “as low as technologically feasible”,9 then, accidents will happen for 
which no one will be culpable (there will be a culpability gap), but this will not be 
a moral problem, because all relevant considerations in terms of safety, justice, and 
responsibility will be respected.
We agree that culpability should not be pursued always and at all costs, and 
that some culpability gaps are unavoidable and morally acceptable. However, we 
doubt that Simpson and Müller have identified a fair system to decide which cul-
pability gaps with AI systems are morally acceptable. Indeed, justice and rights 
can be preserved by setting reasonable standards of care, which may also allow 
for fair culpability attribution and the prevention of unwanted responsibility gaps. 
But this is a statement of the problem, not its solution: it is close to question-beg-
ging. To what extent it is possible to establish standards of reasonable care for the 
design, use, and regulation of AI in the same way in which we do for buildings 
and bridges is precisely the question raised in present-day (legal) debate on the 
responsibility gaps for AI. In relation to US law, Ryan Calo pointed out that cul-
pability gaps with AI may happen precisely because the traditional assumptions 
about what should count as sufficient intention, knowledge, and foreseeability on 
9 In their words: “If it is possible to build robots that comply with a strict tolerance level, then that is 
obligatory. But if it is not possible, the best we can do is good enough” (316–7).
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the side of the defendant (criminal law) may not apply, due to the emergent and 
unpredictable behaviour of AI (Calo, 2015, p. 542). Also, traditional assump-
tions on designers or managers having “exclusive control” on artefacts can hardly 
apply in relation to systems whose behaviour is influenced by a chain of differ-
ent actors (manufacturers, programmers, users). How to achieve a fair and right-
respecting distribution of risk and culpability in this new context is still open to 
discussion. Moreover, the accountability gap potentially created by the unpredict-
able, opaque, and interactive behaviour of artificial intelligence may also make it 
difficult to establish a priori whether the system will be able to comply with the 
requirement of fairness: designers and users of artificial intelligence may simply 
not be in the position to know that a system is discriminatory or otherwise unfair 
in the first place.
A related concern with Simpson and Müller’s proposal is that by stating 
that the “threshold of safety” eventually determining the culpability attribution 
should be “as low as technologically feasible”; they risk to encourage the belief 
that this is mainly a technical question, one that is up to engineers and “experts” 
to solve. However, giving engineers and other “experts” the power to decide on 
this threshold may result in a technocratic approach sharpening rather than solv-
ing the culpability gap: technical experts may (honestly) believe that nobody 
is to blame for an accident because they have done what could reasonably be 
expected from them, but this may not match with the well-informed judgement 
of a non-expert and the moral and legal requirements of society. In fact, recent 
legal history of the standards of negligence in medical practice shows a trend 
towards abandoning a system in which courts rely exclusively on expert profes-
sional opinion for their assessment of professional malpractice. This is due to 
the recognition that professional opinion may sometimes be “unreasonable” or 
“irresponsible”, too conservative, biased, or otherwise reflecting the interests of 
the members of the profession rather than the interest of the public. Also from a 
normative point of view, courts being “dictated to” by experts were considered 
as a dangerous shift towards technocracy and not in line with a “right-based” 
society (Mulheron, 2010).
Relatedly, from a broader perspective, old-style division of labour – engineers 
give facts to regulators and regulators establish whether the technology is safe 
enough – does not incentivise mechanisms of moral accountability between engi-
neers and societal stakeholders (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990), insofar as they may 
not sufficiently promote a well-informed public deliberation on what a “reason-
able threshold” of safety (and other values) in emerging technology should be. 
Nor does this approach incentivise engineers to go beyond the current state of 
art in technology and look for innovative solutions which may improve the capa-
bilities of current technology to better satisfy complex and potentially conflicting 
societal demands (Van den Hoven et al., 2012) such as, for instance, higher levels 
of safety combined with better predictability etc. In the terminology introduced 
above, deflationist strategies like Simpson and Müller’s fail to address gaps in the 
active responsibility of engineers. They may also fail to address gaps in (public) 
accountability, insofar as they seem to delegate to experts the setting of a reason-
able standard of care.
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3.2  The Risks of Solutionism
Others recognise the novelty of the responsibility gap but do not believe in its 
intractability and have tried to offer some new technical and legal solutions to 
address it. Whereas some of these solutions might in principle be part of a com-
prehensive strategy to address the problem of responsibility gap in its entirety 
and complexity, their authors often fall short of providing such a comprehensive 
plan. Moreover, even when this is not the intention of their authors, these propos-
als even run the risk of fuelling the temptation of “solutionism” (Morozov, 2013); 
(Stilgoe, 2017), the belief that complex socio-technical and political problems can 
be “solved” (or avoided) by the introduction of new techniques. We distinguish 
here two main approaches to address the responsibility gaps, the technical and the 
legal, and we suggest that if taken in abstraction from the broader picture presented 
above, these run the risk of leading, correspondingly, to “technical solutionism” 
and “legal solutionism”.
3.2.1  Explainable AI and “Technical Solutionism”
One of the commonly recognised causes of generically defined “responsibility gaps” 
is, as we have seen in the previous sections, the lack of transparency, explainability, 
and interpretability of machine-aided decision-making, be it defined as just algorith-
mic or properly AI. Although there being multiple senses and extents to which a sys-
tem can be said to be explainable (Doran et al., 2017), we will stick to the most basic 
form, where “a user cannot only see, but also study and understand how inputs are 
mathematically mapped to outputs”, and where transparency of the whole process is 
granted. Theorists identified transparency and explainability of algorithms and AI 
as an important element to safeguard the “traceability” of human responsible agents 
and, consequently, a fair attribution of moral responsibility (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). 
We believe that algorithmic explainability, though constituting one interesting ele-
ment in a complex strategy to address the responsibility gaps, is neither a sufficient 
nor a necessary condition to address them. Believing the contrary would amount to 
what we have called “technical solutionism”: the belief that new technological solu-
tions may be sufficient in themselves to address complex socio-technical and politi-
cal problems.
One reason for explainability not being sufficient to address the responsibility 
gaps is that, as seen, such gaps are due to different problems that are not entirely 
addressed by increasing transparency and explainability of the algorithmic parts of 
a system. Mittelstadt et al.  (2016, p. 12), echoing Simon (2015), correctly pointed 
out how an important factor determining traceability, still under-researched, is the 
fact that responsibility is distributed, or diffused, “across a network of human and 
algorithmic actors simultaneously”, which is closely related to what we previously 
refer to as “the problem of many hands” and, more generally, “organisational black 
boxes”. Relatedly, algorithmic transparency and explainability do not necessar-
ily allow for fair attribution of moral and legal culpability. Very complex systems 
might be in principle understandable and open to scrutiny, but perhaps only “after 
the fact”, by a very selected audience, and in a relatively large timeframe. But this 
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does not mean that this behaviour may be sufficiently understood and predicted in 
advance by any of the human agents involved in their design use or regulation. Nor 
does this entail that any of these agents has been given a sufficient awareness and 
capacity to comply with some specific obligations, to prevent some outcome, to 
explain it once it has happened, or both.
Relatedly, explainability might in other cases also not be necessary to address 
culpability, accountability, and active responsibility gaps. Some culpability and 
accountability gaps with AI can be potentially addressed by providing some agents 
along the chain of design, development regulation, use with a sufficient knowledge 
of the limitations of the technical systems (including their opacity etc.), and a suf-
ficient awareness of their obligation to prevent unwanted results in the deployment 
of a such technologies (Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018). That is by promot-
ing their active responsibility. In the presence of sufficient knowledge and training, 
then, for instance, a military commander can be reasonably held accountable and 
culpable for his conscious decision to deploy an unpredictable technical system in a 
military mission, which ends up in the unlawful killing of innocent civilians. Simi-
larly, the manager of a car manufacturing company and/or the chair of a road safety 
agency can be legitimately held accountable and culpable for their decision to put/
allow on the public road a vehicle whose behaviour, as they well knew, could not be 
sufficiently predicted and explained. In a relevant sense, they could and should have 
known better.10
3.2.2  New Liability Regimes and the Risks of “Legal Solutionism”
Some legal scholars and policy-makers have recently recognised that the introduc-
tion of AI systems may potentially increase the number of accidents and/or intro-
duce new kinds of accidents and/or increase the number of accidents for which vic-
tims may not receive compensation, due to the difficulty of applying existing legal 
liability regimes, typically negligence and product liability, to any of the actors 
involved in the network of design and use of new technologies: the legal culpabil-
ity gap (Calo, 2015) (Pagallo, 2013).11 To address these issues, they have commit-
ted themselves to work towards revising or introducing new liability mechanisms, 
which may allow for compensating victims of accidents involving AI for which no 
clear human fault can be attributed. Some of these regimes would be the faultless 
compensation schemes for damages caused by AI systems discussed by Schellekens 
(2018) and the introduction of electronic personhood proposed among others by the 
European Parliament resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (Delvaux, 2017) 
and discussed among others by Koops et al. (2010) and, in a critical fashion, Bryson 
et al. (2017). However, an exclusive focus on bridging the liability gap may be insuf-
ficient and potentially self-defeating from the point of view of the broader plan of 
bridging the responsibility gaps.
10 More controversial would be the application of this logic to the case of technology developers, due to 
their smaller power in the managerial decisions.
11 See Sect. 2.1 above.
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As we have explained in Section 2.1, there are several reasons why we might 
want to preserve fair practices of attribution of moral blame and culpability as 
well as “active responsibility” practices in addition to fair and effective prac-
tice of legal liability and compensation schemes. Answering the questions “who 
should be legally punished” or “who pays” (Pagallo 2015) for wrong AI-mediated 
decisions and behaviours is not sufficient to answer the broader question “who is 
responsible” for them and how to prevent these outcomes in the first place. Liabil-
ity regimes grounded in individual culpability or fault (such as criminal liability 
and criminal and civil liability by negligence) might be well-suited to deal with 
clear and bold individual responsibilities. However, they might be less adequate 
to cope with substantial shared responsibilities derived from manifold individual 
small faults. According to an example of van de Poel et al. (2012),  it would not 
probably make sense to hold individual people liable for their share of pollution, 
but that does not mean that they cannot be blamed or shamed for that, or that other 
policy and legislative tools should be used to discourage individual and corporate 
behaviour from increasing pollution. The same can be said about the effects of 
digital technologies.
Faultless liability regimes and legal personhood of artificial agents not only risk 
to shift away attention from culpability and accountability but also from active 
responsibility. In fact, those approaches might underestimate the importance 
of promoting proactive, preventive approaches to create safe and societally ben-
eficial technical systems. Liability regimes are managed by the State and require 
strict standards of causation, evidence, and seriousness. Effective as they may be 
in (dis)incentivising some behaviour, those regimes do not and cannot cover all 
undesirable behaviour. It is not possible or desirable, e.g. to have the State check-
ing and judging professional behaviour, but that does not mean that anything goes. 
Since risky behaviours without (provable) harm would fail to be sanctioned under 
a liability scheme, professionals’ good conduct can only be granted by relying on 
their own awareness and knowledge of their moral and legal responsibility towards 
society, and their individual capacity and motivation to comply with it. Moreover, 
corporate or civil liability may not be a strong incentive to behave, e.g. for agents 
or companies who can easily afford to pay any fine or compensation or may rely 
on the difficulties to enforce legal norms in this field12; blaming and shaming and 
strong political initiatives may sometimes be a more effective tool.
In addition to adjust and revise regimes of liability, we also need to create 
better mechanisms to promote the moral accountability of all agents involved in 
the design and use of AI systems; better mechanisms of public accountability for 
those who design or regulate AI systems operating in the public space; and, pos-
sibly more importantly, mechanisms and policies to promote a better culture of 
active responsibility of all the designers, managers, controllers, and users of AI 
systems.
12 A prominent example being the recent story of the GDPR, that some critics summarised in: the 
“world’s toughest privacy law” proven “toothless” (Vinocur, 2019).
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4  The Need of a Comprehensive Approach to Address 
the Responsibility Gaps and the Promises of “Meaningful Human 
Control”
Our analysis has shown that the problem of responsibility gap is not one prob-
lem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, 
moral and public accountability, active responsibility – caused by different 
sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. And 
that partial approaches to the responsibility gap – i.e. focusing only on one 
form of responsibility and/or only one source of gaps – not only bring the risk 
of offering an incomplete picture of the problem but also a distorted one, one 
that hinders the creation of an appropriate response (Fig. 1). In this last sec-
tion, we will try to outline what a more comprehensive approach may look 
like (Table  2). We will do so by referring to what we consider to be a very 
promising approach to be found in the literature on ethics of AI: the recent 
interpretation of “meaningful human control” by Santoni de Sio and van den 
Hoven (2018). Future work will have to further develop and substantiate this 
proposal.
4.1  Meaningful Human Control: the Concept
Experts from different disciplines have recently converged towards the idea that 
granting “meaningful human control” over AI would substantially contribute to 
address responsibility gaps. Multiple accounts of meaningful human control 
(MHC henceforth) have been therefore proposed (Ekelhof, 2019). They mostly 
consist of sets of normative requirements to promote a legally, ethically, and soci-
etally acceptable form of human control. Originally proposed in the context of 
lethal autonomous weapon systems (Amoroso & Tamburrini, 2019; Article36, 
2014; Chengeta, 2016; Ekelhof, 2019; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015; Moyes, 2016; 
Schwarz, 2018), MHC has been recently investigated in the field of automated 
driving systems (Calvert et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Heikoop et al., 2019; Mecacci 
& Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018) and medical 
automation (Braun et al., 2020; Ficuciello et al., 2019). Relatedly, the importance 
as well as the difficulty of defining the kind of “meaningful human involvement” 
required to avoid responsibility gaps in automated decision-making is highlighted 
in the art. 22(1) GDPR as interpreted by the Article 29 Working Party/EDPB.
In their seminal work, Santoni de Sio and Van Den Hoven (2018), produced a 
philosophical account of MHC that aims to: (a) a more solid theoretical frame-
work, grounded in philosophical theory of moral responsibility and control (Fis-
cher & Ravizza, 1998) and (b) a strongly design-oriented perspective, according 
to the value-sensitive design approach. Their ambition is to provide a unified 
conceptual framework which also provides some principles to practically (re)
configure AI to minimise possible responsibility gaps, by acting at the level 
of technical as well as organisational and legal design. According to their the-
ory, in order for AI systems to be under meaningful human control, two major 
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conditions have to be satisfied, called “tracking” and “tracing”. These conditions 
describe, respectively, the nature of the control relation and the features that a 
human–machine system should strive for to maintain human responsibility on 
the system. Tracking requires that the socio-technical system – i.e. the whole 
combination of technical, human, and organisational elements – is designed to 
demonstrably respond to the relevant reasons of the relevant agents and to the 
relevant facts in the environment.13 Tracing requires that the socio-technical sys-
tem is designed so that for each of the (relevant) actions of the system, it is 
possible to identify at least one human agent along the chain of design, devel-
opment, and use that possesses both (i) sufficient knowledge of the capabilities 
and limitations of the system and (ii) sufficient moral awareness of, and capac-
ity to comply with, her role as potential target of legitimate response for the 
behaviour of the system. Tracking requires the alignment of the system with the 
values, reasons, and intentions of the relevant human  agents; tracing requires 
the alignment of the system with the capacities of the relevant human agents. 
According to an operational, causal notion of control – mainly adopted in scien-
tific and technical domains – a technical system is under the control of a human 
agent when there is a reliable causal connection between their and the machine’s 
behaviour. The philosophical and normative idea behind MHC is that morally 
relevant control and moral responsibility depend on the socio-technical system 
being aligned with the reasons and the capacities of the relevant human agents 
(reasons and capacities not behaviour are the source of “meaningfulness”).
4.2  The “Tracking” Condition and its Payoffs for Responsibility
In contrast with “technical solutionism”, and in line with legal-oriented solutions, 
the MHC approach recognises that human control requires not only new technical 
features to promote technical transparency (explainable AI) but also different social, 
institutional, and legal arrangements to promote organisational and political trans-
parency about the control roles. The “tracking condition” for MHC demands a sys-
tematic specification of the control roles based on the system “responsiveness” to 
human reasons. This requires as a first step a map of all the relevant agents involved 
in the design, control, regulation, and use of a system, as well as an analysis of the 
extent to which their reasons, values, and intentions are (or should be) reflected in its 
behaviour. Mecacci and Santoni de Sio (2020) have recently started developing such 
a map in relation to automated driving systems (dual-mode vehicles).
13 An important clarification: the tracking condition does not necessarily require that machines respond 
to abstract values or that abstract reasons and values are hard-coded in the machine; it does require that 
the socio-technical system (human + machine) is responsive: the human elements can do the job. At the 
same time, also some “autonomous systems” (operating without human supervision) may remain under 
MHC under some circumstances, to the extent they are sufficiently capable to interact with the (morally) 
relevant aspects of the environment in which operate, e.g. a self-driving car operating on a dedicated 
lane with “readable” signs and relatively predictable interactions. Correspondingly, many autonomous 
systems may not be compatible with MHC, typically those operating in environments presenting relevant 
(moral) features too difficult to interpret for the machine (e.g. present-day battlefields), or learning sys-
tems able to reprogram themselves in ways that may not demonstrably track the reasons of designers, 
regulators, relevant users, etc. (including science-fictional artificial general intelligence).
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As a further illustration, consider the recent Uber accident (Bellon, 2018; 
Stilgoe, 2020), in which a car in automated mode but with a human operator 
onboard ran over a pedestrian due to a technical failure in the sensing system. 
Who was in control of the system and thus responsible for the accident? The legal 
liability process clearly relied on a narrow notion of control: the onboard opera-
tor was deemed in control of the system as the vehicle was responsive to her 
behaviour (she was in the position to intervene and avoid the crash), and since 
she failed to behave as requested by her role, she was considered negligent and 
liable for the death (BBC News, 2020). This answer sounds too simplistic: more 
“controllers” are involved in this story. By using Mecacci and Santoni de Sio’s 
(2020) approach, we can more easily identify other actors whose higher-level 
plans and goals played or could have played a control role in the story, and may 
therefore have some form of responsibility in it. Just to mention two: the vehi-
cle’s dangerous behaviour was clearly dependant also on the explicit intention 
of the owning company (Uber) to test new not-yet-safe self-driving features on 
the public road with the intention of pushing their technical development, and 
the opportunity to do these tests was created by the Arizona’s authorities with 
the goal of attracting (big) tech companies in their State (National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, 2019). So it seems fair to attribute some prima facie moral 
culpability also to them for the death. This in turn triggers a moral duty for them 
to explain to the victim’s relatives and to the broader public the reasons of their 
strategic and political choices (moral and public accountability). Correspond-
ingly, the map offers a starting point for designers, policy-makers, and research-
ers to identify the different active responsibilities of the agents involved, as well 
as a general schema to identify the policy, legal, technical, and organisational 
interventions needed to ensure that the system is sufficiently responsive to the 
right reasons of the relevant agents.
4.3  The Tracing Conditions and its Payoffs for Responsibility
Unlike proposals based on new forms of legal liability, MHC proposes that socio-
technical systems are also systematically designed to avoid gaps in moral culpa-
bility, accountability, and active responsibility. The “tracing condition” proposes 
that a system can remain under MHC only in the presence of a solid alignment 
between the system and the technical, motivational, moral capacities of the rel-
evant agents involved, with different roles, in the design, control, and use of the 
system. The direct goal of this condition is promoting a fair distribution of moral 
culpability, thereby avoiding two undesired results: first, scapegoating, i.e. agents 
being held culpable without having a fair capacity to avoid wrongdoing (Elish, 
2019): in the example of the automated driving systems above, for instance, the 
drivers’ relevant technical and motivational capacities not being sufficiently stud-
ied and trained. Second, impunity for avoidable accidents, i.e. culpability gaps: 
the impossibility to legitimately blame anybody as no individual agent possesses 
all the relevant capacities, e.g. the managers/designers having the technical capac-
ity but not the moral motivation to avoid accidents and the drivers having the 
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motivation but not the skills. The tracing condition also helps addressing account-
ability and active responsibility gaps. If a person or organisation should be mor-
ally or publicly accountable, then they must also possess the specific capacity to 
discharge this duty: according to another example discussed above, if a doctor has 
to remain accountable to their patients for her decisions, then she should maintain 
the capacity and motivation to understand the functioning of the AI system she 
uses and to explain her decision to the patients. If a public organisation has to 
remain accountable to their citizens, then arguably public officers and civil serv-
ants, not IT experts and private companies, should maintain the capacity and moti-
vation to understand and explain the behaviour of their institution to the citizens, 
no matter how much technology is involved in the decision. So, the tracing condi-
tion poses a strong accent on the individual, context-relative capacities needed for 
the relevant human actors to remain accountable to different subjects and fora and 
in relation to different activities. The analysis and promotion of (moral) capacities 
are also key to ensure the discharge of various active responsibilities by various 
actors. The responsible innovation approach invites stakeholders to be responsive 
to one another and to the relevant values in the process of technological develop-
ment (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The tracing condition also demands that these stake-
holders are effectively supported in acquiring the context-specific capacity, oppor-
tunity, and motivation to do so. For instance, across the years, the aviation sector 
has built up a culture of safety or the medical profession a culture of care: as also 
recently proposed by the Horizon 2020 Commission Expert Group to advise on 
specific ethical issues raised by driverless mobility, (Bonnefon et al., 2020), a new 
“culture of responsibility” – new practices, incentives, identities – should be pro-
moted within private and public organisations in relation to the design and use of 
AI-based systems.
5  Conclusion
To improve the understanding of the problem of the “responsibility gap” for 
artificial intelligence (AI), we have proposed to rely on a comprehensive analy-
sis of four forms of responsibility presented in some relevant philosophical and 
legal literature. A first result of this analysis is a reasoned map of four potential 
responsibility gaps in socio-technical systems that include AI (Table 1). A sec-
ond result is the presentation of some limits of the current, partial, approaches 
to responsibility gaps, which fail to identify the complexity of the responsi-
bility gap problems (Fig.  1). A third result is the sketch of a proposal for a 
more integrated and comprehensive approach to address, by design, the four 
responsibility gaps in their interrelations. The proposal is grounded in one par-
ticular interpretation of “meaningful human control” (Table 2). Based on these 
results, future philosophical, empirical, and technical work will have, among 
other things, to further clarify which responsibility gaps (may) emerge in rela-
tion to different systems in different contexts of application, and the extent to 
which the approach to meaningful human control here presented may effec-
tively address these gaps.
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